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Abstract 
Most wŽƌŬĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐĐůŝŶŝĐĂůǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐƚŚĞŶŽƌŵƐŽĨĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ
within established professional-patient relationships, but such responsibilities may extend beyond 
the clinical context. We explore ŚĞĂůƚŚǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?professional reƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŝŶƐƵĐŚ ‘ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂů ?
encounters through the example of a doctor witnessing the misdiagnosis and mistreatment of a 
serious long-term condition in a television documentary, arguing that neither internalist approaches 
to professional responsibility (such as virtue ethics or care ethics) nor externalist ones (such as the 
 ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ ?ŵŽĚĞů ?provide sufficiently clear guidance in such situations. We propose that a 
ĚŽĐƚŽƌ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌŝƐďĞƐƚĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ mix of both approaches, emphasising the non-complacency 
and practical wisdom of virtue ethics, but grounding the normative authority of virtue in an external 
ƐŽƵƌĐĞ ?ŝƐĂďůĞƚŽĞŶŐĂŐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŚĞĂůƚŚǁŽƌŬĞƌ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŝŶƐƵĐŚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?
the health care system, and the population at large. 
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Introduction 
The vast majority of work in medical ethics concernsMedical ethics scholarship focuses chiefly on 
what is sometimes called  ‘ĐůŝŶŝĐĂů ? ethics, examination of the responsibilities of health workers within 
the context of an established professional-patient relationship. But medical problems do notmay 
arise only withinoutside the confines of such relationships, and professional responsibilities may 
extend beyond ƚŚĞĐůŝŶŝĐĂůĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ? ‘'ŽŽĚ^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶ ?ĐĂƐĞƐŽĨĨĞƌƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ďƵƚ
 “ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂůŵĞĚŝĐŝŶĞ ? extends beyond such situations covers a range of other situations (Leavitt, 
Peleg, and Peleg 2005). We explore describe one such situation, faced by one of us  W, of deciding 
what to doĂĐůŝŶŝĐŝĂŶ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽ having witnessedwitnessing the likely misdiagnosis and 
mistreatment of a disabling long-term condition while watching a medical television documentary.  
This case brings upraises a range ofseveral questions regarding ĐůŝŶŝĐŝĂŶƐ ?professional 
responsibilityresponsibilities, concerning: their scope  W to what extent is the viewer responsible to 
act at allwhether they extend to cover such situations; their object  W to whom are they, or on whose 
behalf, is the responsibility owed; and their content  W what action(s) do such responsibilitiesthey 
require? To answer these we explore the normative foundations of professional responsibility  W the 
grounds upon which the claims of professional obligation are seen to be morally binding for health 
workers. Two different approaches to grounding professional responsibilities  W internalism and 
externalism  W offer potential guidance in answering these questions. Internalism views professional 
responsibilities as arising from the nature of medical practice itself, a viewpoint perhaps most 
thoroughly explored in the virtue ethics (VE) of Edmund Pellegrino (Pellegrino 2001; Pellegrino 
2006), also found in much workfrequently in the care ethics (CE) tradition (Held 2005). Externalism 
instead , by contrast, grounds professional responsibility in some more general moral theory, applied 
ƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ position in society. We focus hĞƌĞŽŶ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ ?(SC) models of professional 
responsibility as an exemplar of an externalist positionm, given the widespread popularity of this 
approach among medical professionals as an account of the normative underpinnings of 
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professionalism (Medical Professionalism Project 2002; Working Party of the Royal College of 
Physicians 2005; Wynia 2008). This position maintains that grounds professional responsibilities are 
grounded in a contract between the medical profession and the society in which it is situated, with 
the responsibilities of the that commits the profession directed towardto promotion and protection 
of the health, not only of individual patients, but also the public at large. 
 We use insights from both internalist and externalist accounts to engage with professional 
responsibilities in situations like ours. Externalist accounts offer a more secure grounding for 
settlingmore securely settle the scope and object of responsibilities in such settings, while the 
 ‘ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůǁŝƐĚŽŵ ?ĂŶĚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝǀĞŶĞƐƐƚŽŵŽƌĂůŶƵĂŶĐĞƐŽĨ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞĚŝŶ
internalist accounts also prove valuable.  We suggest that these complementary strengths may be 
applied apply these complementary strengths through an  ‘ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĂů ?s W where the telos of 
medical practiceine is determined by external deliberation, not viewed as being internal to certain 
aspects of the practice. dŚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞƐƚŚĞĐůŝŶŝĐŝĂŶ ?Ɛƌesponsibilities to the patient at the 
centre of the case, the healthcare team featured in the documentary, and the viewing public. It 
stresses the normative significance of supporting the capacities of individual patients against their 
specific vulnerabilities, and enabling all others working within a health care setting  W including 
journalists  W to promote resilience against these vulnerabilities.  
Informal diagnosis by television 
Documentaries showing real people in real crises  W in particular, health crises  W consistently attract 
great public interest. Health crises  W resolved or otherwise  W are a popular topic of such 
documentaries. One of these, set in emergency departments (EDs) of large acute hospitals in the 
United Kingdom, follows individual cases as they present and receive treatment. One episode 
followed a man
a
 in his twenties who was brought to an identified emergency department (ED)ED by 
                                                             
a
 ZĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽŚĞŶĐĞĨŽƌƚŚĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ? W this is for clarity of reference, though NB he does not stand in a 
formal doctor-patient relationship to some of the clinicians involved in this scenario. 
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ambulance in a seizure which by his arrival had already been going on for nearly 30 minutes at the 
time of his arrival. The ambulance staff and emergency roomED doctors made a diagnosis of status 
epilepticus (SE - prolonged or recurrent epileptic seizures without recovery), a condition with 
significant morbidity and mortality requiring urgent assessment and treatment to address any acute 
underlying cause or prevent brain injury through persistent epileptic activity (Brophy et al. 2012). A 
personally identifiableThe ED doctor in charge of his treatment administered several boluses of 
intravenous benzodiazepines (a potent and sedative anticonvulsant medication) well in excess of 
maximum recommended daily doses. When this treatment proved unsuccessful, intravenous 
phenytoin was given (a second-line anticonvulsant medication with a wide range of possible serious 
side effects). When both approachesthese had failed to stop the seizure activity, the doctor called an 
anaesthetist to intubate the patient and induce general anaesthesia (as the ultimate emergency 
treatment for status epilepticusSE). The seizure stopped as the anaesthetist was on the verge of 
intubating the patienton. Follow-up Iinterviews with the patient recorded after his discharge from 
hospital made clear that he had presented in this fashion several times before, and that he had been 
discharged with a diagnosis of epilepsy / SEstatus epilepticus, which had apparently never been 
challenged or changed during his admission. He remained on anti-epileptic drugs (AEDs) as a 
treatment for his seizures. 
However, the appearance of the seizure, which was (clearly displayed in the documentary), cast 
serious doubt on the diagnosis of SE; one of us (an expert in seizure disorders and in the analysis of 
video-electroencephalographic (VEEG) recordings) saw the documentary and thought it highly likely 
that the patient was in fact experiencing a non-epileptic seizure (NES). NES resemble epileptic 
seizures superficially but (as the name suggests) they are not caused by the abnormal electrical 
activity in the brain which is the neurophysiological basis of epileptic seizures. Instead, most NES are 
interpreted as episodes of reduced self-control representing an experiential and behavioural 
response to aversive internal or external stimuli which the patient is unable to cope with in other 
ways (Reuber 2009).  Although the diagnostic gold standard for the distinction of epileptic and 
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nonepileptic seizures involves the simultaneousVEEG recording of a typical seizure with VEEG 
(LaFrance et al. 2013), it has been shown that the observable differences in seizure semiology which 
have been described in previous video-EEG studies allow experts to make correct clinical diagnoses 
in over 90% of cases (Avbersek and Sisodiya 2010; Chen et al. 2008).  Given the very prolonged 
nature of the seizure captured in the TV documentary, characterised by unremitting tremulous, 
asynchronous movements of the ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛlimbs, closed eyes, an undulating intensity of the motor 
activity and semipurposeful movements (e.g. lack of movement in one arm during removal of 
clothing from this limb), the expert watching the TV documentary was quite certain of the diagnosis 
of NES rather than SE. The use of AEDs, especially during prolonged seizures, can aggravate NES and 
has no therapeutic role (Niedermeyer et al. 1970; Reuber, Enright, and Goulding 2000); in fact 
managing NES as epilepsy, especially treating non-epileptic status as SE, carries a significant risk of 
iatrogenic morbidity and mortality (Reuber, Baker, et al. 2004; LaFrance and Benbadis 2006). 
Ethical issues arising from the case 
It will be a major contention of the argument below that the first ethical challenge confronting the 
clinician in such a scenario is that of discerning all the morally salient features. We propose these 
concern at least: how or whether one should approach a patient one believes to have been 
misdiagnosed toward whom one has no formal clinical responsibilities; how or whether to respond 
to ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨ ‘ƉŽŽƌ ?ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ(insofar as the patient was given an incorrect diagnosis and given 
dangerous and ineffective treatment as a result); and what to do when a common, severe, and 
disabling medical condition is misrepresented in national media. 
Addressing first the patient, the question is whether the doctor should communicate (e.g. to health 
workers responsible for their care) Ă ‘ƉĂƐƐĞƌ-ďǇĚŝĂŐŶŽƐŝƐ ?ŽĨE^(Mitchell 2008; Mitchell 2011). Not 
clarifying the diagnosis impairs access to effective treatment (AEDs are of no benefit for NES, but 
interventions including careful explanation of the condition, psychoeducation and psychotherapy 
may help (LaFrance, Reuber, and Goldstein 2013)) and carries the risk of severe iatrogenic harm 
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(Reuber, Baker, et al. 2004; LaFrance and Benbadis 2006). But there is also the potential of harm 
arising from intervening, for example through misdiagnosis. Whilst the appearance of the seizure 
shown in the documentary made a diagnosis of NES highly likely, error remains possible; 
furthermore, there is no way to establish from viewing one seizure whether a person may 
experience both NES and epileptic seizures, which would necessitate different and careful 
intervention ? ‘hŶĚŝĂŐŶŽƐŝŶŐ ?ĞƉŝůĞƉƐǇ presents a further potential threat  W chronic health conditions 
become closely associated witŚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?ƐŽĐŝĂůŝĚĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚƐĞůĨ-representations, so that 
changing diagnostic labels can cause psychological distress, affect social networks or alter available 
social or financial support (Karterud, Knizek, and Nakken 2010; Solomon, Klein, and Bourdette 2012).  
The question is not simply one of whether to diagnose, but how; conveyed well, the introduction 
ofsimply making the NES diagnosis alone can be an important intervention in management of the 
condition (LaFrance, Reuber, and Goldstein 2013), but (as with other functional disorders) the 
implied psychogenic component of the diagnosis can be a source of significant resistance and 
distress for patients (Thompson et al. 2009; Monzoni et al. 2011). Even the decision of what to call 
NES is complicated by the stigmatising nature of some labels such as  ‘ŚǇƐƚĞƌŝĂ ?Žƌ ‘ƉƐĞƵĚŽƐĞŝǌƵƌĞƐ ?
(Stone et al. 2002). 
Focussing instead on the health workers involved in treatment, the normative questions arising 
concernwe must consider the risk to future patients whom the health workers involved may 
encounter. Responding to this risk will depend on the extent to which the event witnessed is 
thought to be an individual aberration or a systematic failure; in the first case intervention would be 
directed at rectifying the aim to rectify deficiencies in knowledge or ability of a few specific 
individuals, while the second would require more widespread alteration of medical training to rectify 
correct an injustice faced by individuals with NES   W ( ‘ŝŶũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?ďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƚĞƌŵŚĞƌĞƐŝŶĐĞ
medical institutions  W perhaps compounded by stigmatising beliefs regarding functional disorders 
held by many health workers, especially those dealing with medical emergencies (Worsely et al. 
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2011)  W would be established in such a way that they systematically treatinged NES patients in ways 
that threaten theirdeleterious to health and wellbeing  W perhaps compounded by stigmatising 
beliefs regarding functional disorders held by many health workers (Worsely et al. 2011)). 
The third set of questions concerns the appropriate response to the nationwide broadcasting of NES 
misdiagnosed as SE and the consequent potential for misunderstanding, both of epilepsy and NES. 
Filming of acutely unwell people in emergency departmentsEDs raises suspicions of the potential for 
exploitation ofpotentially exploits people in vulnerable situations (Geiderman 2001; Godfrey and 
Henning 2007). Dramatic representations of epilepsy as a dangerous and unmanageable condition 
can feed into a public anxiety at odds with medical reality (Baxendale 2003); and public 
misunderstanding of conditions like epilepsy or NES may facilitate stigma surrounding those 
conditions, and make inappropriate emergency admissions more likely if similar NES are mistaken 
for SE. Furthermore, for individuals struggling with a diagnosis of NES made on the basis of a 
presentation similar to that depicted, seeing another person with the same presentation instead 
ďĞŝŶŐĚŝĂŐŶŽƐĞĚǁŝƚŚĞƉŝůĞƉƐǇŵĂǇĐŽŵƉŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶĂŶĚĂŵƉůŝĨǇƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨďĞŝŶŐ ‘ůeft in 
ůŝŵďŽ ?ƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞ NES patients with NES report after they have receivedreceiving this diagnosis 
(Thompson et al. 2009),, if notor even result increate resistance to and rejection of what can 
alreadya sometimes  often be a fraught and contested diagnosis (Monzoni et al. 2011). To determine 
examine the scope, object, and content of professional responsibility on these issues, we examine 
putative normative foundations for such responsibilities. 
Normative foundations for professional responsibilities 
While being a member of a profession is widely held to entail the assumption of moral 
responsibilities beyond those attendant upon lay members of a given community, there is no clear 
agreement on why this should be the case. Approaches to providing such responsibilities with a 
normative grounding can broadly be divided into two categoriesThere are two broad categories of 
potential normative foundations for such responsibilities. Internalist accounts look to the nature and 
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practice (in Alasdair MacIntyre ?Ɛ (2007) sense) of the profession itself, viewing professional 
responsibilities as integral to being able to perform properlyproper performance of itsthe 
characteristic activities of the profession; externalist accounts ground professional responsibility in 
some external source  W e.g. a fully general moral theory such as utilitarianism. 
dŚĞŵĞĚŝĐĂůƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐŽǁŶŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŝƚƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇĞŶĚŽƌƐĞĂn externalist 
account  W ƚŚĞ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ ?(SC) model (Wynia 2008; Medical Professionalism Project 2002; Royal 
College of Physicians et al. 2010). This views professional responsibilities as emerging from a bargain 
between society and the profession. The profession agrees to provide a vital social good  W 
promotion and protection of the health of patients and the public  W in return for the right to self-
regulation, and a degree of monopoly over the political, economic and labour activity needed to 
achieve such provision. Other externalist accounts include those grounded in Rawlsian 
contractualism, and consequentialist theories  Wthese often also converge on assigning the 
profession responsibility for patient and public health promotion and protection.
b
  
The SC model makes healthcare professions responsible for protection and promotion of health of 
patients and public, but that does not straightforwardly mean each professional bears that 
responsibility. Distribution of group responsibilities to members depends upon the thing for which 
they are held responsible, and how the collective devolves responsibility to its members (Lawford-
Smith 2012). The difficulty for our case, though, is that, in the United Kingdom at least, the 
professional standards invoked to devolve responsibility offer little guidance. Legal advice sought by 
                                                             
b
 ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽEŽƌŵĂůĂŶŝĞůƐ ?ZĂǁůƐŝĂŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?ŚĞĂůƚŚƉƌofessions serve as the public institution discharging 
a collective social obligation to protect fair equality of opportunity through promotion of public health (Daniels 
1985); and it is plausible that a consequentialist account of professional responsibility would maintain that (a) 
professional responsibilities are determined by the role the profession (as a collective) is able to play in 
promoting best outcomes; and (b) the manner in which the profession is able to promote best outcomes is by 
protecting and promoting health of the community. 
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the doctor in the above scenario stated that there was no legal responsibility to act in any particular 
fashion (Medical Defence Union, personal communication).  
The only informal encounter explicitly discussed in professional ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐŝƐƚŚĞ ‘'ŽŽĚ^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶ ?
act  W when a health worker encounters a person in immediate need of medical attention and there 
is no other more suitable person around to offer it. In such cases both professional guidance and 
professional opinion alike are (in the UK) fairly clear and conclude that there is a responsibility to act 
(Williams 2003; General Medical Council 2013). However, Good Samaritan scenarios responsibilities 
offer little guidance for our case; and even if the Good Samaritan framework was extended, it would 
still be inadequate for dealing fully with our case. Good Samaritan responsibilities They address only 
ĂƉŚǇƐŝĐŝĂŶ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽŝndividuals they encounter, but but several of the ethical questions 
raised by our scenario also raised questions regarding concerned the team responsible for treating 
the patient originallyother health workers, and the state of care for NES patients as a whole, andor 
their representation in the media.  
Various methods have been proposed for extending medical ethical principles and codes of conduct 
in situations where no clear guidance is offered. These include specification, whereby more explicit 
guidance is derived from more basic principles and codified into existing practice guidance 
(Richardson 2000); casuistry, which looks to settled decisions from relevantly similar cases for 
guidance (Strong 2000); and balancing, which proposes to weigh competing considerations to 
determine which take priority in a given situation (DeMarco and Ford 2006). While space prevents us 
from engaging extensively with these positions, we find none satisfactory for our and similar cases. If 
rules of specification were sufficiently detailed to engage with all the morally salient particulars of 
different cases, codes of practice would become impractically extensive and unwieldy (DeMarco and 
Ford 2006, 486), and would always be struggling to keep up with new developments in the social 
landscape. (suppose rules are extended to cover television diagnosis; what of cases encountered on 
internet video platforms, or publicised via social media?). Casuistry, with its reliance on moral 
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resemblance of different situations, obscures moral work by assuming such comparatorsthat morally 
similar situations are readily identifiable,e, ignoring the details that separate problem cases from the 
 ‘ĞĂƐŝĞƌ ?ĞǆĞŵƉůĂƌƐ(DeMarco and Ford 2006, 490). And balancing assumes that all ethical dilemmas 
are  “ĐƌŝƐŝƐŝƐƐƵĞƐ ? ?ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐ well-defined claims; this can neglects the 
 “ŚŽƵƐĞŬĞĞƉŝŶŐŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?ŽĨĐůŝŶŝĐĂůĞƚŚŝĐƐ ?the subtleties of how we construct and conduct 
relationships, engage with others, and go about working and living (Warren 1992, 37). 
&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ĂůůƚŚĞƐĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƐƵĨĨĞƌĨƌŽŵǁŚĂƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶĐĂůůĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐƚďŝĂƐ ?of some 
approaches to bioethical deliberation  W ƚŚĞ “ƚĂŬĞŶ-for-granted attitude according to which the 
narrative construction of human reality is transparent, readily ĂĐĐĞƐƐŝďůĞĂŶĚƌĂƌĞůǇĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĂů ?
(Barilan and Brusa 2013). Each assumes that the morally salient features of and relevant norms for a 
given case are readily apparent; but in our case (and similar situations), much of the normative work 
involves simply establishing what these features and norms may be, before we even begin to 
question what might constitutedeliberate over an appropriate response to them ? “ĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞ
ŵŽƌĂůůǇƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐŽĨĂƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŶŽĞĂƐǇŽƌĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝĐŵĂƚƚĞƌ ? (Little 1995, 121).  
An alternative means of resolving this dual requirement for subtlety and flexibility in the response to 
informal encountersapproach such as our case is to focus, not on the appropriate rules of conduct, 
but rather onthe kinds of dispositions and habits that enable professionals need to display to fulfil 
their professional responsibilities in such situations; in other words, to conceive of professional 
responsibilities as virtues. Such an approach is moreThese are commonly found emphasised in 
internalist accounts of professional responsibility. 
The most famous ƐƵĐŚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝƐĚŵƵŶĚWĞůůĞŐƌŝŶŽ ?Ɛ VE, which derives norms from a description of 
ƚŚĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŽĨŵĞĚŝĐŝŶĞĂƐƚŚĞĐůŝŶŝĐĂůĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ ?ŝƚƐĞŶĚĂ “ƌŝŐŚƚĂŶĚŐŽŽĚŚĞĂůŝŶŐ
ĂĐƚŝŽŶĨŽƌĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŚƵŵĂŶďĞŝŶŐ ? (Pellegrino 2006). Pellegrino conceives of virtues as dispositions  
to think and act that permit a person to work toward achieving the ends of medicine  W. Attributes 
such as fidelity, honesty, compassion, prudence (or practical wisdom) and suppression of self-
11 
 
interest may help the doctor perceive and balance balancing the different dimensions of the 
ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŐŽŽĚĂŶĚ to employing medical knowledge and skill to further this richly-conceived 
goodthis good ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ‘ŚĞĂůŝŶŐĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?(Pellegrino 2001; Pellegrino and Thomasma 1993). A similar 
approaĐŚŝƐĨŽƵŶĚŝŶƐŽŵĞĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĂƚĨŽĐƵƐŽŶ “ƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĞůůŝŶŐŵŽƌĂůƐĂůŝĞŶĐĞŽĨ
attending to and meeting the needs of the particular others for whom we take responsibility ? (Held 
2005).  
The main difficulty with applying such internalist moralities to our case, and to informal medicine in 
general, is that ďŽƚŚWĞůůĞŐƌŝŶŽ ?ƐsĂŶĚŵĞĚŝĐĂůƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĞƚŚŝĐƐĨŽƌexisting relationships, but the 
first ethical problem in informal medicine is establishing the relationship in the first place. A 
professional morality grounded in the clinical relationship assumes matters of scope are already 
settled and so struggles to provide guidance where the scope of responsibilities is precisely what is 
at issue. While one might argue that the virtues necessary for excellence in clinical practice would 
automatically dispose clinicians to view themselves as bearing responsibilities to others in formal 
scenarios, there is no does not seem to be a non-circular reason to hold that this should be the case. 
Indeed, authors such as Pellegrino (VE) and Nel Noddings (CE) stress the partiality of the appropriate 
dispositions that require the virtuous agent to be engrossed in the needs of those with whom they 
are in established relationships, to the exclusion of more distant others (Veatch 1990; Noddings 
1986).
c
 
While internalist accounts struggle to settle questions about the scope of professional responsibility 
in cases like ours, they are more illuminating regarding object andthe content of those 
responsibilities. By contrast, externalist accounts clearly demonstrate that there is at least a 
collective responsibility on the part of the profession to act in cases like ours, but methods of 
                                                             
c
 A reviewer for an earlier version of this paper stated that it would be a very odd to conclusion conclude to 
draw ƚŚĂƚWĞůůĞŐƌŝŶŽ ?ƐsǁĂƐƐŝůĞŶƚŽŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞĚŽĐƚŽƌ-patient relationship. We agree this is so, 
but nonetheless it appears to follow from the strict internalist account. Pellegrino does in fact look at virtue 
beyond the clinical encounter, but when he does so it is by shifting the foundations of professional virtue  W to 
ĂďƌŽĂĚĞƌĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ƚŚĂƚŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐĐĂƌŝŶŐĨŽƌĂůůŝŶƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ŽƌĞǀĞŶďǇŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐ
explicitly externaůŝƐƚĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂ ‘ĐŽǀĞŶĂŶƚ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? 
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inferring individual responsibilities in our case proved difficult to apply. This suggests one possible 
means of progress; to infer professional responsibilities in our scenario drawing on a virtue-based 
framework, but one grounded in an externalist account of professional morality.  
Though it might initially seem contradictory to invoke apparently internalist and externalist accounts 
simultaneously, this need not be the case. Some VE and CE authors define the characteristic 
practices of healthcare more broadly, so as to encompassing the health of all in society (Pellegrino 
and Thomasma 1993, 86; Tronto 1995, 142).
d
 Alternatively, one can explicitly invoke a virtue 
ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬĂƐĂŶ ‘ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĂů ?ƚŽŽůƚŽƌĞĂůŝƐŝŶŐĂŶĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐƚaccount morality (Driver 2007)  W this 
holds professional responsibilities to be groundedapproach grounds responsibilities in the SC model 
(or some other framework entailing a collective professional responsibility to protect and promote 
the health of all in society), but that to devolve these responsibilities to individuals it is more useful 
to ask not what to do, but how to respond  Wdevolves this to individuals not by rather than stating 
what it isone must do to behave professionally, but byto exploringe what it is to be a professional 
(Nussbaum 1999; Verkerk 2005). We consider this to be a promising approach to answering the 
dilemmas of our case, and in other informal encounters. 
An instrumental virtue-ethical approach to diagnosis by documentary 
As stressed above, eEthical medical practice is not simply a matter of weighing competing moral 
claims or principles in crisis scenarios and determining the best course of action. The first moral 
challenge is simply to notice what is morally salient in the world around us, and how our interactions 
with it spread out to affect those around us (Little 1995). In our case, important issues will hinge 
upon features like the nature of the programme (where the patient had retroactively consented to 
their care being filmed, rather than actively seeking to publicise his condition), the specific nature of 
the NES diagnosis, its relation and similarity to epilepsy, the importance of conversational/ relational 
considerations in the diagnosis and management of NES, cultural and professional interpretations of 
                                                             
d
 Though some question whether expanding definitions in this fashion means they lose their distinctive 
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐƚĞůĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŝŶĐĞ ‘ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ?ĂƌĞďŽƚŚůĞĂƌŶĞĚĂŶĚĚĞĨŝŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞŝƌĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ(Annas 2011) and caring 
essentially concerns sensitivity to and engrossment in needs of close others (Held 2005, 31 W2). 
Formatted: Font: Italic
13 
 
functional disorders, and so forth. And while the moral salience of these particulars may be 
underlined in dealing with contested diagnoses such as NES, they will arise in different forms in 
engaging with any condition or patient group, and will demanding appropriately different responses 
from the professional. s ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŝƚƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶ ‘ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůǁŝƐĚŽŵ ? ?ĂŶĚŝƚƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ
virtue as a skill to be learned rather than a code to adhere to, is well equipped to face these 
challenges. 
Most formulations of VE since Aristotle make central to their accounts of virtueemphasise some 
formthe import ŽĨ ‘ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůǁŝƐĚŽŵ ? ?phronesis, in Aristotelian terminology). This is a capacity to 
discern the morally salient features of a given situation, the possible courses of action available, and 
to navigate through them appropriately; as John McDowell (McDowell 1979) ƉƵƚƐŝƚ ? “ĂŶĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ
ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐǁŚŝĐŚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŵƉŽƐĞŽŶŽŶĞ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ. ?  Recognising the requirements 
of a collective professional responsibility to promote health is not the same as directly assigning the 
ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽindividuals. The prudent professional phronimos acknowledges that 
promoting a healthy society cannot be pursued independently and requires coordination across 
healthcare and public health services, and will for the most part guide her actions accordingly, in 
coordination with other health workers. But she goes beyond the usual standards of clinical practice 
and organisation of clinical services in adopting an attitude of non-complacency toward the 
ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛresponsibilities of the profession. She will be aware that the usual mechanisms for 
distributing responsibilities amongst professionals may sometimes fail, and be disposed to go 
beyond usual norms of professional conduct to rectify these failures, and ensure that systems will be 
more resilient against such failures in future.  
A VE approach emphasises both the practical wisdom required to identify different morally salient 
dimensions of the situation, (relating to the individual patient, to other NES patients, to the treating 
team/hospital, and to the health service at large); and the non-complacency to acknowledge a 
potential need to act. Fully displaying such sensitivityIt would furthermore requires acknowledging 
14 
 
the variousdifferent ĨĂĐĞƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŐŽŽĚ in this context: the risks of medical harm, but also 
their understanding of old and new diagnoses, the impact the new diagnosis might have on their 
self-view and relationships with others, and the potential for resistance to psychologising 
interpretations of their condition. In lieu of the sensitivity of these features to the manner in which 
an NES diagnosis is introduced and explained, it is important to consider not just whether or not to 
make known the diagnosis to a patient, but how to go about doing so  W to determine who would be 
the best person to undertake a more complete diagnostic assessment (not only taking account of 
the seizures shown on TV but also the patient ?s previous history and potential other symptoms) and 
be responsible for ongoing management, and how to avoid undermining confidence in other 
healthcare professionals following misdiagnosis and mistreatment. To engage with these factors 
sufficiently would require more knowledge than is available to the viewing doctor, and may be best 
attempted through those already in a formal professional-patient relationship with the patient. Thus 
a non-complacent but sensitive course of action in this case might first be to raise the issue with 
ĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞĨŽƌƐŽŵĞĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĐĂƌĞ ? 
Discussing the situation first with others already involved in the care of the patient has a further 
advantage. Virtue-based understandings of professional responsibility view it as a skill to be learned, 
not a set of rules to be followed. According to Aristotle, virtue is learned through its practice, and we 
learn how to perform virtuous actions first by emulating those we think virtuous. But skill  W or virtue 
 W is not emulation alone; as Julia Annas (2011) argues, learning such practices instead requires 
seeing how they are performed in a variety of contexts, reflecting on salient points and coming to 
understand what makes given ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐƐŬŝůĨƵůŽƌǀŝƌƚƵŽƵƐ ?ZĞĨůĞĐƚŝǀĞĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽŶĂĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ
standards of virtue is , on her account, crucial inore to learning virtueto be virtuous. By consulting 
with colleagues, the doctor in this scenario is able to test their own interpretation of the situation 
against the assessment of others, and work toward consensus on clinical assessment of the patient  W 
providing a kind of moral and medical  ‘ƉĞĞƌƌĞǀŝĞǁ ? ?Moral peer review would further permit 
ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐ ?ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ Wthrough collective deliberation, rather than 
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through each independently following a given decision procedure or abstract specification of 
principles.
e
 
Application to the case 
Responsibilities to the patient 
'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨƌĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ^-like presentations, if he were instead to be suffering from 
NES, then he would have a strong interest in correction of this misdiagnosis, due to the substantial 
morbidity and mortality associated with management of prolonged NES as SE, and the inappropriate 
treatment of his NES disorder with AEDs (Reuber, Enright, and Goulding 2000; Reuber, Baker, et al. 
2004; LaFrance and Benbadis 2006). The A correction of the diagnosis would also allow him to gain 
access to NES-the potential benefits of appropriate therapeutic approaches for NESinterventions 
(such ase.g. psychotherapy). However, the potential threat of misdiagnosis (or comorbid epilepsy) 
must also be entertained here, even though previous studies demonstrate the high level of 
diagnostic accuracy which can be achieved when experts see video-recordings of seizures (without 
additional EEG or clinical data) (Chen et al. 2008).
f
 Furthermore, any effort to correct such a putative 
misdiagnosis must be sensitive both to the potential therapeutic benefits and harms of the manner 
in which the diagnosis is given (LaFrance, Reuber, and Goldstein 2013; Thompson et al. 2009) and 
ƚŚĞƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůƐĞƋƵĞůĂĞŽĨ ‘ƵŶĚŝĂŐŶŽƐŝŶŐ ?ĞƉŝůĞƉƐǇ(Karterud, Knizek, and Nakken 2010; 
Solomon, Klein, and Bourdette 2012). 
A cautious approach to action in light of these sensitivities was, in fact, pursued by one of the 
authors,,  first approaching neurologists and psychiatrists at the hospital in question who would 
know more about localthe procedures at the hospital and may have more of a relationshiphad prior 
                                                             
e
 Drawing attention to this conception of learning virtue may also have important ramifications for howfor 
medical ethics and professionalism is taughtteaching in healthcare education. Rather than insistingence of 
application of certain principles of conduct, it would look instead to the exemplars of professionalism provided 
ƚŽƐƚƵĚĞŶƚƐĂŶĚƚƌĂŝŶĞĞƐďǇĐůŝŶŝĐĂůƌŽůĞŵŽĚĞůƐ ?ƚŚƵƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŚŝĚĚĞŶĐƵƌƌŝĐƵůƵŵ ?(Hafferty 1998) of 
medical education. 
f
 It is difficult to operationalise the level of certainty in the diagnosis here; while diagnostic levels of certainty 
for NES have been proposed (LaFrance et al. 2013), they are of limited applicability here given the very 
prolonged nature of the seizure and the lack of a semiologically-similar epileptic seizure against which to 
compare its clinical and EEG characteristics. We thank a reviewer of a previous version of this paper for raising 
the question of defining level of certainty in the diagnosis. 
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contact with the patient in question. This offered multiple advantages. Given the stress on 
professional virtue as a practical skillAs discussed above,  ‘ƉĞĞƌƌĞǀŝĞǁ ?ŽĨŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĐůŝŶŝĐŝĂŶƐ ?
interpretation of the morally salient features of events becomes an important means of developing 
virtuous practice and ensuring that the profession collectively discharges its responsibilities to 
society; such discussions afford an opportunity for such review. Furthermore, it permits an enhanced 
understanding of the situation and the actions required by drawing upon the experience of others 
who may be more knowledgeable regarding relevant details concerning the patient or the hospital.  
Additionally, it minimised the risk of misdiagnosis, by making the assertion of a clinical diagnosis the 
collective action of a group of experts, with rather than a lone individual. There is evidence 
suggesting that such group diagnoses are more likely to be ĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞƚŚĂŶĂŶǇŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛ
independent efforts (Stroink et al. 2004).  
Having discussed the case with tIn our case, the neurological and psychiatric teams  W who 
corroborated suspicions regarding the likely misdiagnosis - they were well-placed toand identify 
identified a doctor in an appropriate doctor-patient relationship with the patient to arrange 
appropriate follow-upongoing management., thus the viewing clinician was able to initiate action 
furthering the patient ?ƐŐŽŽĚ ? 
Responsibilities to the healthcare team 
The evidence of misdiagnosis and subsequent mismanagement, with potential for severe iatrogenic 
morbidity and mortality, raises further questions of responsibility toward the treating healthcare 
team and their future patients. Patient safety and quality improvement research consistently 
highlights theA range of systemic, institutional, social and personal factors are implicated in clinical 
error (Reason 2000); it would be unfair and ineffective to treat this case as arising solely from error 
on the part of treating clinicians. It may even be the case that  W given the need for prompt 
intervention in cases of true SE  W that best practice might involve intervening even where NES 
cannot be ruled out, if it were thought that the risks of not intervening in SE outweigh those of 
intervening in NES. However, the non-complacency stressed by us above as being central to virtuous 
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practice suggests that the clinician should not assume that this is the case, and be prepared actively 
to pursue better ways of training healthcare workers and constructing management guidelines that 
might minimise both types of risk. Given thĂƚ ‘ƐƵƐƉĞĐƚĞĚƐĞŝǌƵƌĞ ?ŝƐamongst the top ten reasons for 
accessing emergency healthcare (Dickson et al. Forthcoming), such actions are all the more 
important since this is not an isolated incident, but an instance of a more widespread problem 
(Reuber, Enright, and Goulding 2000; Reuber et al. 2002; Leach et al. 2005). 
The clinician who observed the likely misdiagnosis and  Wmanagement on TVviewing clinician 
contacted the Clinical Director of the Emergency DepartmentED in question so that the issue could 
be discussed with the treating doctor(s) and . confirmed that extra training would be arranged for ED 
staff. Whether this is an effective means of effectively protecting protects future patients against 
similar error is an empirical question to which we as yet do not know the answer, but studies show 
that short teaching interventions raising awareness of NES and familiarising trainees with the visible 
semiology of NES and epilepsy usiŶŐǀŝĚĞŽƌĞĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƐĐĂŶŵĂƌŬĞĚůǇŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚŽĐƚŽƌƐ ?ĚŝĂŐŶŽƐƚŝĐƐŬŝůůƐ 
 ?K ?^ƵůůŝǀĂŶĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ?^eneviratne et al. 2014). This could be an instance of a more general problem 
across the health service, so witnessing such episodes reaffirms the importance of educating not 
only neurologists but also generalists about NES and related conditions, especially when considering 
. Bringing the case to the attention of other colleagues (in all specialties) when opportunities arise 
may be of value in prompting further reflection on guidelines for emergency management in cases 
of suspected SE, highlighting that alternative diagnoses should be considered. Guidelines already 
incorporate consideration of oOther differentials such as eclampsia are already included (Brophy et 
al. 2012) and suggestions for alternative management outlined; while features raising suspicion of 
eclampsia (i.e. pregnancy!) may be more obvious, this shows the potential for incorporating 
flexibility into such guidance. 
These considerations  W ŵƵĐŚůŝŬĞƚŚĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚŽĨŽƚŚĞƌĐůŝŶŝĐŝĂŶƐŝŶ ‘ƉĞĞƌĞǀŝĞǁ ?discussed 
above  W also highlight that virtuous practice is a collaborative process. The success of interventions 
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on the part of the witnessing clinician here depend on the receptiveness of others to his concerns 
and advice. Thus moral sensitivity and noncomplacency in the face of moral need must not just 
concern what health workers see around them, but also reflection on their own practice, and their 
skill and knowledge limitations.  
Responsibilities to the media and public  
This last set of questions concerns the relationship between health professionals and media workers 
producing health-related content, and the responsibilities of health workers for public engagement 
around conditions they see, treat, and research. Without cooperation between media and health 
workers, there is potential for exploitation of people in situations rendering them particularly 
vulnerable, and for misrepresentation of stigmatised conditions in public arenas. 
The making of documentary series involves film crews being granted privileged access to sensitive 
clinical areas which would normally be out of the public eye. For emergency presentations such as 
apparent SE, it would obviously be highly unlikely that prior informed consent could be gained from 
subjects for such filming; thus retrospective consent is usually sought by documentary makers. Most 
dDiscussions of the ethics of such documentaries have focussed on the quality of this consent 
(Geiderman 2001; Godfrey and Henning 2007; Marco et al. 2002). Properly informed consent is 
difficult to obtain in such conditions, and may still leave individuals open to harm or exploitation; 
even competent adults will be in a position of some vulnerability from being acutely unwell and , 
under time pressures, and may feel compelled to agree (Godfrey and Henning 2007), perhaps 
exacerbated by concernsconcerned that refusal may affect their treatment (Geiderman 2001). While 
the observer of our scenario is not best positioned to engage in this controversy, they may still be 
able to make some contribution contribute to better consent processes. 
The UK broadcasting code
g
 requires only that consent be obtained for filming and broadcasting such 
footage, without specifying conditions of adequacy for such consent. It makes a broad exception for 
 “ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ? ?ĂƚĞƌŵit considers to includecovering  “ƚŚŽƐĞǁŝƚŚůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐ ?ƚŚŽƐĞ
                                                             
g
 Set by Ofcom, the independent regulator and competition authority for the UK communications industries. 
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with mental health problems, the bereaved, people with brain damage or forms of dementia, people 
ǁŚŽŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƚƌĂƵŵĂƚŝƐĞĚŽƌǁŚŽĂƌĞƐŝĐŬŽƌŵĞŶƚĂůůǇŝůů ?(Ofcom 2015, 44)), who are deemed to 
lack capacity to consent altogether without simultaneous consent of a guardian. It is unclear 
whether people with epilepsy or NES would be deemed vulnerable on this  ‘ůĂďĞůůŝŶŐ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽ
vulnerability, which is in any case overly simplistic.  
The labelling approach is at once too narrow (by ůŽŽŬŝŶŐĂƚŽŶůǇƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƐƚĂƚƵƐĂƐĂƐŽƵƌĐĞŽĨ
vulnerability, it neglects contextual and situational factors that may render them so), and too broad 
(since ŝƚůĂďĞůƐǁŚŽůĞŐƌŽƵƉƐĂƐ ‘ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ ?ŝŶĂwhole broad range of situations, without 
considering their ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?specific circumstances and capacities) (Rogers 2013). A more adequate 
conception of vulnerability for these purposes considers vulnerability as: relational (people are not 
vulnerable simpliciter, but vulnerable to certain threats in certain situations); dynamic (changing 
through time and situationally modifiable); and a continuum (not a binary condition, but 
continuously graded  W thus interventions should be tailored less toward denying the decision-making 
ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇŽĨ ‘ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ ?ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ŵŽƌĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ
end of the spectrum) (Bell et al. 2014). 
A relational and dynamic understandingThis conception of vulnerability highlights that questionable 
consent can be improved by modifying aspects of the decision environment to promote authentic 
decision-making. Adopting tTemporal strategies that treat consent as a continuing process rather 
than a discrete event has been suggested as being of particular valuemay be of us here (Bell et al. 
2014). Medical professional associations recommend their members adopt temporally-extended 
 ‘ĚƵĂůĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ ?ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐǁŚĞŶĨŝůŵŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐĨŽƌƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐ(Marco 
et al. 2002; BMA Medical Ethics Department 2011)  W this could be suggested as a first approach forto 
media workers alsotoo.  
More generally, clinicians will develop a range of communication skills they find useful for 
supportingthat support the decision-making capacities of different patients, and these can be shared 
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with others who are seeking dialogue with them. This is of particular significance in our case since 
pPatients with NES may be particularly susceptible to certain forms of exploitation through 
inadequately-designed consent procedures, quite apart from the situational features that make 
retrospective consent in the case of questionable merit. Though It is plausible (though a matter of 
ongoing controversial)y that, it could be argued that certain personality traits which 
characterisedisplayed by many patients with NES patients (Reuber, Pukrop, et al. 2004; Cragar et al. 
2005) render them particularly vulnerable to inauthentic decision-making even when competent.: 
One important subgroups of patients with NES is characterised by high emotional lability, high levels 
of impulsivity, and a tendency to emotion-linked cognitive distortions. This can make it difficult to 
establishimpede consistent communication of authentic values, or even adequate interpersonal 
relationships to facilitate such communication (Winburn and Mullen 2008). Another major subgroup 
of NES patients with NES has a tendency to strictly-conforming, highly-controlled behaviour (Reuber, 
Pukrop, et al. 2004). This may exacerbate the unequal status relationship between those seeking and 
giving consent in the clinical setting and call the validity of consent into question for different 
reasons (Geiderman 2001). Highlighting these potential vulnerabilities to documentary makers, and 
describing some strategies useful for ameliorating them in clinical contexts (Szmukler 2009), may 
help prevent inadvertent exploitation of such patients in future encounters.  
Issues around consent and vulnerability are not the only ethical concern that must be confronted 
with the documentary makers. TIn addition to the topic of consent and vulnerability, the 
misdiagnosis itself and consequent misrepresentation of both epilepsy and NES by the documentary 
may needs addressing. Mass media and fictional representations of epilepsy present the condition 
as far more dangerous than it is in the majority of cases, which may exacerbate anxiety around 
receiving and living with such a diagnosis (Baxendale 2003). NES, meanwhile, is a diagnosis with 
which many initially struggle and which they may find hard to reconcile with their own self-
understanding (Thompson et al. 2009; Whitehead, Kandler, and Reuber 2013). Misrepresentation of 
pseudostatus prolonged NES as SE thus carries a double threat, obscuring understanding of both 
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epilepsy and NESSE ?ƌŽĂĚĐĂƐƚŝŶŐĐŽĚĞƐĂŶĚŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞũŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐƚƐ ?ĐŽĚĞƐŽĨĞƚŚŝĐƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂ
commitment to accuracy and fair contextualisation (Schwitzer 2004; Ofcom 2015),
h
 and health 
journalists themselves emphasise the primacy of objectivity and avoiding sensationalism in quality 
journalism (Leask, Hooker, and King 2010). This suggests that media workers covering health issues 
should be responsive to attempts to improve their understanding of conditions the people they seek 
to portray are living with, and how these are shown to the viewing public. 
It would be beyond the capacities of the viewing clinician in our case to act on all the potential moral 
threats to both documentary subjects and viewing public, however it is nonetheless within their 
scope to initiate action on these issues. A first step  W as one of us pursued in this case  W is simply to 
contact the documentary makers responsible to raise concerns; in doing so it is of particular 
importance to provide support and resources to address the knowledge gaps and procedural 
shortcomings that may make some patients vulnerable in the filming and consent processes, or lead 
to misrepresentation and misunderstanding of health conditions. Regarding inaccurate 
representation of conditions and possible consequent harms, this contact needs to address 
questions both of how to rectify past broadcasts of misleading content, and what procedural 
measures could be adopted to prevent such occurrences in future. 
In other publishing arenas  W such as academic literature  W ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞƌƐ ?ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞ
Committee on Publication Ethics offer clear guidance on how to identify and respond to errors in 
published material  W with appropriate responses ranging from errata to retractions (Committee on 
Publication Ethics 2015). However, there are important disanalogies between academic publication 
and broadcast media that make such guidance of little utility in this contexthere. Academic 
publications stand as part of the research record and are more permanent  W remaining accessible in 
journal archives and the like  W than the relatively evanescent lifespan of broadcast television (even 
with the expansion of catch-up services). Erroneous data in scientific publications are also more 
                                                             
h
 An extensive range of ethical codes for newsrooms can be found at the website of the American Society of 
News Editors, www.asne.org. Most include principles similar to those referenced above.  
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likely to have a direct impact on future work (e.g. treatment decisions, further research) than 
ĞŶƚĞƌƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐ ?ƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƐĂƌĞŵŽƌĞĚŝĨĨƵƐĞ ?contributing to shaping a 
general public perception of the services and conditions displayed rather than being directly used 
asdirectly providing grounds for action. For both these reasons, retraction and other post-hoc 
interventions are a less useful tool, but the reporting clinician can at least advise on errors that 
should be addressed if the broadcast were to be repeated or viewable online.  
Perhaps more important is the attempt to create procedural measures that might reduce the future 
occurrence of such inaccuracies. Simply highlighting public educational and self-management tools 
relevant to portrayed conditions is a fairly easy first step to assist broadcasters in understanding 
better the experiences of the people whose lives they cover. In order to help contextualise the 
material broadcast on television, documentary makers could additionally publicise such support 
material as a part of future programmes (as many UK TV programmes already do for some issues 
e.g. mental health and suicide). Another (not exclusive) course of action might be to attempt to 
create dialogue between health workers and health journalists more generally regarding the 
intersection of thĞŝƌƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŶŐĂŶĞǁƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŽŶŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ-
neglected topics in the developing field of health journalism ethics (Schwitzer et al. 2005).
i
  
Conclusion 
More and more people are happy being to be recorded in all sorts of situations, and illness 
narratives are shared through ever more media channels. Individuals post videos about  W or of  W 
their conditions on social media platforms. Their institutional interactions are routinely recorded on 
audio or video (e.Ő ? “ĨŽƌƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĂŶĚƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂƐƐƵƌĂŶĐĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ? ?. And it is becoming increasingly 
ƌŽƵƚŝŶĞƚŽƐĞĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƌĞĂůůŝĨĞŚĞĂůƚŚƉƌŽďůĞŵƐƉůĂǇĞĚŽƵƚŝŶdsƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐ ? Health workers can 
                                                             
i
 This case raises at least as many questions concerning journalistic professional responsibilities, and  W as one 
reviewer of a previous draft highlighted  W ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŝƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ
in addressing cases like this. In this paper, however, we are concerned primarily with the practice of informal 
medicine and so focus on health workers ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ? 
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encounter people in apparent need of support in all these contexts. Virtue-based accounts of 
professional responsibility recognise the importance of moral perception in distinguishing the 
nuances of what is morally salient in such situations; externalist accounts, meanwhile, help to ensure 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĂƌĞĂůǁĂǇƐǀŝĞǁĞĚĂƐďĞŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĞƚǇŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚey work, 
and to keep them directed toward a collectively-determined end of promoting health and wellbeing. 
While our case may be a somewhat unusual one, it is increasingly likely  W given the explosion of 
interest in illness narratives and healthcare documentaries  W that health workers will encounter a 
range of mass-media portrayals of unwell people in situations requiring action by someone within 
the profession to discharge its collective responsibilities. Drawing on both internalist and externalist 
accounts of professional responsibility is a valuable exercise in determining how best to act in these 
encounters. 
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